University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2018

Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate Bylaws
Jill E. Fisch
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Business Organizations Law
Commons, Contracts Commons, Industrial Organization Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Other
Business Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, and the Public Policy Commons

Repository Citation
Fisch, Jill E., "Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate Bylaws" (2018). Faculty Scholarship
at Penn Law. 1737.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1737

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

Governance by Contract: The
Implications for Corporate Bylaws
Jill E. Fisch*
ABSTRACT
Boards and shareholders are increasingly using charter and
bylaw provisions to customize their corporate governance. Recent
examples include forum selection bylaws, majority voting bylaws, and
advance notice bylaws. Relying on the contractual conception of the
corporation, Delaware courts have accorded substantial deference to
board-adopted bylaw provisions, even those that limit shareholder
rights.
This Article challenges the rationale for deference under the
contractual approach. With respect to corporate bylaws, the Article
demonstrates that, under Delaware law, shareholders’ power to adopt
and amend bylaws is more limited than the board’s power to do so. As
a result, shareholders cannot effectively constrain the board’s
adoption of bylaws with which they disagree. The resulting power
imbalance offers reasons to question the scope of the contract
paradigm.
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This analysis suggests two alternative solutions. One possibility
is for the Delaware courts and legislature to reconsider existing
constraints on shareholder power in order to level the playing field
between shareholders and directors and fully realize the contractual
paradigm. This approach, which would increase shareholder power,
has important normative implications. Alternatively, if Delaware law
retains the existing limitations on shareholder power, this Article
suggests that judicial reliance on the contract metaphor would be
misguided and that courts should scrutinize board-adopted bylaws
more closely.
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INTRODUCTION
The contractual approach to corporate law has its roots in the work of
leading economists such as Ronald Coase1 and Oliver Hart.2 Although scholars
widely accept the utility of the contract metaphor, they debate its implications
for regulatory policy.3 Some argue that contract principles support substantial
deference to the structural arrangements chosen by corporate participants;4
1. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Meaning, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM:
ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 48, 56 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds.,
1993) (“[T]he firm is essentially a choice of contractual arrangements.”).
2. Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1757 (1989).
3. See, e.g., William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under
Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1563 (1982) (arguing that “[t]he modern business organization can best
be understood as a series of bargains made under constraints,” but describing this position as positive
rather than normative).
4. E.g., FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991).
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others question the appropriate scope of this deference.5 Hart, for example,
observed that governance contracts involving the allocation of rights between
shareholders and managers are particularly likely to be incomplete within public
corporations.6
The contractual approach has become particularly influential in supporting
deference to the participants’ agreed-upon governance terms on both autonomy
and efficiency grounds.7 Commentators have argued that corporate law should
adopt an enabling approach in which default corporate law rules can be freely
modified by firm participants rather than imposing one-size-fits-all mandatory
regulations.8 Increasingly, corporate participants are using private ordering to
customize their corporate governance by adopting issuer-specific terms.9 I have
described this trend as the “New Governance.”10 Recent examples include forum
selection bylaws, majority voting bylaws, and advance notice bylaws.11
Then-Chancellor (now Chief Justice) Strine built upon this well-developed
contractual model of the corporation in Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund
v. Chevron Corp.12 As Strine explained in Boilermakers, “the bylaws of a
Delaware corporation constitute part of a binding broader contract among the
directors, officers, and stockholders formed within the statutory framework of
the DGCL.”13 In so reasoning, Strine was building upon a judicial tradition
5. E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989).
6. Oliver D. Hart, Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications, 105 ECON. J. 678,
690 (1995).
7. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1416, 1446 (1989) (“The role of corporate law here, as elsewhere, is to adopt a background term
that prevails unless varied by contract.”).
8. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Sec. Exch. Comm’r, Statement at Open Meeting to Adopt the
Final Rule Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Nominations (“Proxy Access”) (Aug. 25, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch082510tap.htm [https://perma.cc/S4V9-VPN6] (“[T]he
enabling approach defers to private ordering to determine how each firm should be organized to advance
its particular needs and interests most effectively.”). Other forms of business entity law are more explicit
in providing the maximum effect to the participants’ agreed-upon terms. See Paul M. Altman & Srinivas
M. Raju, Delaware Alternative Entities and the Implied Contractual Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing Under Delaware Law, 60 BUS. LAW. 1469, 1469 (2005) (explaining that the Delaware Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act and Limited Liability Company (LLC) Act are “based upon and reflect
a strong policy favoring broad freedom of contract in connection with almost all aspects of the formation,
operation and termination of Delaware limited partnerships and limited liability companies”); see also
Larry E. Ribstein, Unlimited Contracting in the Delaware Limited Partnership and Its Implications for
Corporate Law, 16 J. CORP. L. 299, 300 (1991) (arguing that the contractual approach reflected in
Delaware’s LLP statute should be extended to corporations).
9. D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright & Marcus Kai Hintze, Private Ordering with
Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125 (2011).
10. Jill E. Fisch, The New Governance and the Challenge of Litigation Bylaws, 81 BROOK. L.
REV. 1637 (2016).
11. See id. at 1654 (describing advance notice and forum selection bylaws); Stephen Choi, Jill
Fisch, Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1145 (2016) (describing majority voting bylaws).
12. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
13. Id. at 939.
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embracing the academic model of analyzing the power relationship among
corporate constituencies in contractual terms.14
Strine’s contractual model of the corporation, as articulated in
Boilermakers, relied on two factors. The first was a theory of implied consent.15
Shareholders implicitly consent to be bound by board-adopted bylaws when they
buy stock in a corporation with a charter that confers that power on the board of
directors. The second was the shareholders’ right to challenge board-adopted
bylaws, including “the indefeasible right of the stockholders to adopt and amend
bylaws themselves.”16 Strine described the shareholders’ ability to do so as
“legally sacrosanct.”17
In ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, the court again relied on this
rationale to uphold a board-adopted bylaw that required a losing plaintiffshareholder to pay the corporation’s litigation expenses.18 The court’s reasoning
was not merely based on a contract analogy but rather specifically treated the
bylaw in question as a contract term, explaining that the bylaw was the
equivalent of a “contractual exception to the American Rule.”19 Somewhat
ironically, the court based its conclusion on the fact that corporate bylaws are
“contracts among a corporation’s shareholders,” despite the fact that the bylaw
in question had been adopted by the board and had not been subjected to a
shareholder vote.20
The broad conception of the shareholders’ bylaw power reflected in both
Boilermakers and ATP is in tension with an earlier Delaware Supreme Court
decision. In CA Inc. v. AFSCME, the court held that a shareholder-adopted proxy
expense reimbursement bylaw was inconsistent with Delaware law because the
shareholders had limited authority to adopt this type of bylaw.21 Specifically, the
court concluded that the board’s statutory authority to manage the corporation
operated as a constraint on shareholder power. As the court explained, “[T]he
internal governance contract—which here takes the form of a bylaw—is one that
would also prevent the directors from exercising their full managerial power in
circumstances where their fiduciary duties would otherwise require them to deny
reimbursement to a dissident slate.”22
The tension between Boilermakers/ATP and AFSCME poses a challenge to
the contemporary understanding that the contractual nature of the corporate form
14. See, e.g., Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prod. & Chem., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010) (citing
Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat’l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 928 (Del. 1990)) (describing bylaws as
“contracts among a corporation’s shareholders”).
15. Boilermakers, 73 A.2d at 955–56.
16. Id. at 956.
17. Id.
18. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 557 (Del. 2014).
19. Id. at 558.
20. Id. Concededly, ATP was a non-stock corporation, but the court did not limit its holding to
non-stock corporations.
21. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008).
22. Id. at 239.
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warrants the high level of judicial deference to private ordering reflected in
Boilermakers. Within the context of the New Governance, the board’s power to
adopt and amend bylaw provisions may, for a variety of reasons, be greater than
the shareholders’ corresponding power to do so. In turn, the resulting limit on
the scope of the contract metaphor offers a reason to question the current judicial
approach to litigation bylaws.
The implications are twofold. First, a commitment to a contractual
paradigm suggests that the Delaware courts and possibly the legislature may
want to reconsider the existing constraints on shareholder power in the name of
facilitating private ordering. In so doing, they will have to consider the possible
consequences of greater shareholder empowerment.23 Second, to the extent that
Delaware law retains the existing limitations on shareholder power reflected in
AFSCME, the courts should engage in greater scrutiny of board-adopted bylaws
because shareholders may be unable to remove those bylaws themselves.24
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, the Article briefly sketches the
foundation for the contractual model of the corporation and the model’s
application to issuer-specific bylaws. Part II identifies constraints on shareholder
power to adopt and amend bylaws that create a disparity between the board’s
power and that of the shareholders. Part III considers the implications of this
disparity for the contractual approach.
I.
THE CONTRACTUAL NATURE OF CORPORATE BYLAWS
The contractual model of the corporation emphasizes that the relationship
between managers and shareholders is contractual in nature. This means that the
governing documents of the corporation—the charter and bylaws—operate and
bind both managers and shareholders as if they had negotiated their terms and
signed them, like a common law contract.25 Originating from a strand of law and

23. These consequences include the increased potential for shareholder activism and the
consequences of that activism. Commentators have disagreed about the normative implications of
shareholder empowerment. Compare William Bratton & Michael Wachter, The Case Against
Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 658–59 (2010) (arguing that increased shareholder
empowerment caused managers to manage to the market excessively), with Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The
Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 836 (2005) (claiming that
“[i]ncreasing shareholder power to intervene . . . would improve corporate governance and enhance
shareholder value by addressing important agency problems that have long afflicted publicly traded
companies”).
24. The balance of authority between shareholders and directors to adopt governance bylaws
has further implications for the scope of permissible shareholder proposals under SEC Rules 14a-8(i)(1)
and (2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(1) & (2) (2016). Consideration of those implications is beyond the scope
of this Article.
25. See, e.g., Jason W. Neyers, Canadian Corporate Law, Veil-Piercing, and the Private Law
Model Corporation, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 173, 214 (2000) (questioning whether the “English model [of
the corporation] is contractual”).

378

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:373

economics scholarship, 26 the model has led some law and economics scholars to
argue that market discipline, imposed through stock prices, would lead to the
adoption of optimal contract terms for shareholders or, at least, better terms than
those imposed by regulation.27
The contractual theory has had important implications for corporate law.28
Scholars have used it to argue that corporate law should facilitate the contracting
process by accepting a wide range of firm-specific, customized contract terms.29
In addition, they have reasoned that corporate law should not mandate a onesize-fits-all approach, both because it is unlikely that policymakers would
successfully identify the optimal corporate law rules and because it is unlikely
that a single rule would be optimal for all issuers.30
The development of firm-specific governance terms has come to be known
as private ordering.31 Although a variety of scholars have identified limitations
to the contractual approach and, as a result, questioned its use as a basis for
limiting mandatory regulation,32 the approach nonetheless provides the
normative basis for private ordering.33 Corporate bylaws offer a mechanism by
which shareholders (and directors) can engage in this private ordering.34
26. See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1703, 1705 (1989) (observing that the “contractual theory of the
firm . . . dominate[d] the thinking of most economists and most economically oriented corporate law
scholars”); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976) (describing the firm as a “nexus
for contacting relationships”).
27. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 1430–33.
28. See generally Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1395 (1989) (discussing implications of the contractual approach for the role of mandatory corporate
law).
29. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 5. Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel are
among the most influential adherents to the contractual model. See Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The
Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1391, 1419 (1992)
(“Easterbrook and Fischel are worthy heirs to the contractual tradition begun by Coase more than fifty
years ago.”).
30. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to
the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990) (summarizing the debate over private ordering
versus mandatory rules).
31. Smith et al., supra note 9, at 127 n.12 (discussing various uses of the term “private
ordering”).
32. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1253, 1275 (1999) (arguing against the application of a contractual approach to the duty of loyalty);
Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L.
779, 784 (2006) (“The contractarian theory has turned out to be based largely on an entirely plausible,
but in fact imaginary, world of contracting.”).
33. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J.
435 (2012) (arguing that federal securities laws should facilitate experimentation with proxy access
through private ordering).
34. See, e.g., Smith et al., supra note 9, at 130 (“We would promote private ordering in public
corporations by lowering the barriers to contracting through the adoption of shareholder bylaws.”).
Firms can also engage in private ordering by the adoption of firm-specific charter provisions. The critical
distinction between the charter and the bylaws is that charter amendments typically require both
shareholder and board approval. In contrast, most states allow boards and shareholders to amend the
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By virtue of its largely enabling structure, Delaware corporate law is
consistent with the private ordering approach.35 The Delaware statute contains
relatively few mandatory provisions.36 Instead, most of the statute provides
default rules that can be modified through an appropriate charter or bylaw
provision.37 For example, the statute contains an antitakeover provision
restricting business combinations with an interested shareholder for a period of
three years but provides a variety of mechanisms by which a corporation can
elect to avoid the application of that provision.38 Similarly, the statute provides
that the board of directors will be elected annually but allows a corporation to
opt instead for a classified board through a charter provision or shareholderadopted bylaw.39
In addition to enabling individual corporations to modify the statutory
default rules, the Delaware statute facilitates private ordering by allowing
corporations to customize their charters and bylaws by including a variety of
optional contract-like terms. One of the better known provisions, DGCL
102(b)(7), allows corporations to adopt a charter provision that limits or
eliminates certain director liability for monetary damages in duty-of-care
claims.40 Another provision authorizes corporations to adopt a charter provision
renouncing an interest in specified business opportunities, thereby limiting
potential claims under the corporate opportunity doctrine.41 The statute also
authorizes corporations to adopt supermajority voting requirements through the
inclusion of an optional charter provision.42
Delaware law allows corporations to use bylaws to similar effect. Under
the Delaware statute, shareholders have the power to adopt, amend, and repeal
bylaws. The corporation can grant directors that same power through a charter
provision, but such a provision cannot remove that power from the

bylaws unilaterally. The requirement of joint action means that the contractual approach has different
implications for the legitimacy of charter provisions, an issue that is beyond the scope of this Article. In
addition, statutes may impose different limits on the scope of permissible private ordering that can be
effected pursuant to a charter provision. See, e.g., Frechter v. Zier, No. 12038, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS
214, at *5 n.19 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2017) (contrasting permissible supermajority requirements under
section 109 with section 102(b)(4)).
35. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of
Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731 (2013).
36. Fisch, supra note 10, at 1671.
37. For exceptions see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2017) (requiring an annual meeting of
shareholders); id. § 170 (restricting payment of dividends).
38. Id. § 203(a).
39. Id. §141(d).
40. John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, “Good Faith” and the Ability of Directors to Assert §
102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law as a Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack
of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 113 (2004) (describing
history and scope of 102(b)(7)). Concededly, the section is not fully contractual in that it exempts four
categories of conduct for which directors cannot be exculpated. Id. at 113–14.
41. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17) (2017).
42. Id. § 102(b)(4).
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shareholders.43 The vast majority of Delaware corporate charters vest the board
of directors with this authority.44
The scope of potential governance bylaws is very broad. The Delaware
statute authorizes corporations to adopt “any provision, not inconsistent with law
or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation,
the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its
stockholders, directors, officers or employees.”45 Because of this broad scope
and because shareholders and boards can each adopt governance bylaws
unilaterally, a substantial amount of private ordering in Delaware corporations
takes place through the adoption of issuer-specific bylaws.46
In turn, Delaware courts have largely accepted the contractual theory of
corporate law.47 As the Delaware Supreme Court explained in Airgas,
“Corporate charters and bylaws are contracts among a corporation’s
shareholders.”48 The contractual theory provides courts with a methodology for
interpreting the charter and bylaws—they are interpreted using contract
principles.49 The theory also provides courts with a basis for enforcement. As
Strine explained in Boilermakers, “[T]he bylaws constitute a binding part of the
contract between a Delaware corporation and its stockholders.”50
In Boilermakers, the court upheld a board-adopted forum selection bylaw
as valid, relying on two different factors. The first was a theory of implied
consent. Strine reasoned that the Delaware statute contemplates that directors
will, if the charter so provides, have the authority to adopt bylaws unilaterally.
Given the statutory framework, if a corporation’s charter authorizes the board to
amend the bylaws, its shareholders implicitly agree that they “will be bound by
bylaws adopted unilaterally by their boards.”51 Shareholders consent by deciding
to invest in the corporation.52
Second, Strine found support for the contractual analysis in light of the
shareholders’ statutory rights when they disagree with a board-adopted bylaw.
As Strine noted, the shareholders possess their own right, comparable to that of
the board, to adopt or amend bylaws.53 Additionally, shareholders have the
43. Id. § 109(a).
44. Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate
Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583, 589 n.25 (2016) (“Universally, publicly traded corporations
grant directors such powers from their inception.”).
45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2017).
46. See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey, The Shareholder Franchise Is Not a Myth: A Response to
Professor Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 811, 821 (2007) (explaining that shareholders can engage in private
ordering by adopting bylaws that modify an issuer’s procedures for electing directors, including the
implementation of majority voting).
47. See, e.g., Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 955 (Del. Ch. 2013).
51. Id. at 956.
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 232 (Del. 2008)).
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power to discipline boards that refuse to accede to a shareholder vote concerning
a bylaw by removing recalcitrant directors from their positions. Strine therefore
concluded that “a corporation’s bylaws are part of an inherently flexible contract
between the stockholders and the corporation under which the stockholders have
powerful rights they can use to protect themselves if they do not want boardadopted forum selection bylaws to be part of the contract between themselves
and the corporation.”54
The Boilermakers decision reflected a powerful endorsement of contractual
freedom in corporate law. As such, it encouraged corporations to engage in
private ordering through the adoption and amendment of corporate bylaws.55
Corporations responded to this invitation. For example, issuer adoption of forum
selection bylaws, which had been used to a limited extent prior to the
Boilermakers decision, “rapidly accelerated” after Boilermakers.56
Issuers also began to experiment with other governance bylaws.57 In ATP,
the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a board-adopted fee-shifting bylaw,
reasoning that the contractual analysis in Boilermakers was applicable.58
Likewise, a number of issuers adopted director qualification bylaws to prohibit
certain types of compensation agreements for activist-nominated director
candidates.59 A few issuers even adopted bylaws compelling arbitration.60
54. Id. at 957.
55. Issuers had previously adopted various types of governance bylaws. For example, advance
notice bylaws, which require a shareholder to provide the issuer with advance notice of the intention to
nominate competing director candidates, were prevalent prior to the Boilermakers decision. See
WilmerHale,
2015
M&A
Report
5
(2015),
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/2015WilmerHale-MA-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HR3U-MVZK] (estimating that “95 percent of the S&P
500 and 90 percent of the Russell 3000 had advance notice provisions at 2014 year-end”). Delaware law
imposes a high standard for enjoining advance notice bylaws. See, e.g., Gibson Dunn, Advance Notice
Bylaws: Trends and Challenges 2 (2015), https://www.gibsondunn.com/advance-notice-bylaws-trendsand-challenges [https://perma.cc/55EC-KWHQ] (explaining that the court’s decision in AB Value
Partners “clarifies that under Delaware law, advance notice bylaws will only be enjoined in cases that
pass the relatively high bar of ‘inequitable circumstances’”).
56. Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private Ordering Solution to Multiforum
Shareholder Litigation, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 31, 38 (2017). The Delaware legislature
explicitly endorsed the validity of forum selection bylaws in 2015. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f),
109(b) (West 2015).
57. See generally Fisch, supra note 10 (describing range of board-adopted governance bylaws).
58. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 556 (Del. 2014). The Delaware
legislature subsequently amended the statute to prohibit fee-shifting bylaws. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§
102(f), 109(b) (West 2015).
59. See Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, How
Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case of the Golden Leash, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 649, 652–53 (2016).
Notably, the golden leash bylaw experience was consistent with Strine’s reasoning in Boilermakers.
When shareholders objected to the bylaws by withholding their votes from directors who adopted them,
the offending board responded by repealing the provisions. Id.
60. See Claudia Allen, Bylaws Mandating Arbitration of Stockholder Disputes?, 39 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 751 (2014). Several courts upheld the decision to adopt an arbitration bylaw by one issuer, a
Massachusetts REIT, although the analysis did not implicate Delaware corporate law. Del. Cnty. Emps.
Ret. Fund v. Portnoy, No. 13-10405, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40107 (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2014) (applying
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Commentators argued that the validity of such bylaws followed from the
reasoning in ATP and Boilermakers.61
Shareholders also increased their efforts to engage in private ordering
through the adoption of governance bylaws. In recent years, shareholders have
proposed a variety of governance reforms through bylaw amendments, including
majority voting, proxy access, and the right of shareholders to call a special
meeting. These proposals have enjoyed considerable voting support. As of
January 2014, for example, “almost 90 percent of S&P 500 companies ha[d]
adopted some form of majority voting.”62 The year 2015 was a “break-through
year” for proxy access shareholder bylaws, due in part to a shareholder proposal
campaign by the New York City Comptroller.63 Most proxy access proposals
received support by a majority of shareholders, and a growing number of issuers
are adopting some form of proxy access.64
II.
LIMITS OF THE CONTRACT ANALOGY: POWER ASYMMETRY BETWEEN THE
BOARD AND SHAREHOLDERS
As noted above, boards and shareholders are using private ordering to adopt
issuer-specific governance bylaws. If these bylaws are properly understood as
negotiated terms of a contract, arguably courts should give them broad deference.
The Boilermakers and ATP decisions relied on this rationale to uphold forum
selection and fee-shifting bylaws, respectively.
There are two critical problems, however, with the contractual analysis.
One problem is the question of whether shareholders truly should be understood
to consent to the terms of the charter and bylaws as Strine reasoned. The issue of
consent is an important one, but it is beyond the scope of this Article.65 The
res judicata to deny plaintiff’s motion for a declaratory judgment); Katz v. CommonWealth REIT, No.
24-C-13-001299 (Md. Cir. Ct. Aug. 31, 2015) (citing contractual analysis of the Boilermakers decision);
Corvex Mgmt. LP v. CommonWealth REIT, No. 24-C-13-001111, 2013 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 3 (Md.
Cir. Ct. May 8, 2013) (denying motion to stay arbitration on the basis that the plaintiffs had assented to
arbitration where the shares bore a legend providing constructive notice and the plaintiffs were
sophisticated investors).
61. See Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional Investors, to Keith F.
Higgins, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, and John Ramsey, Acting Dir., Div. of Trading and Mkts., SEC
(Dec. 11, 2013) (reasoning that decisions like Boilermakers could lead corporations to adopt arbitration
bylaws).
62. Choi et al., supra note 11, at 1121.
63. SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT, PROXY ACCESS PROPOSALS 1 (2015),
http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/memos/firmmemo_07_30_15_proxy-accessproposals.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TZV-HZWD].
64. WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES, WHAT’S NEW FOR THE 2016 PROXY SEASON: ENGAGEMENT,
TRANSPARENCY,
PROXY
ACCESS
AND
MORE
7
(2016),
https://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/1_22_16_governance-alert_final2.pdf?cid=8590500125
[https://perma.cc/4J78-U338] (reporting that 124 issuers adopted proxy access between Jan. 1, 2015,
and Feb. 4, 2016, either voluntarily or in response to a shareholder proposal).
65. For further discussion of this point, see Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract,
96 B.U. L. REV. 485, 496 (2016).
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second problem, which this Article addresses, is that for a variety of reasons
shareholder power to amend the bylaws is more limited than the Boilermakers
decision suggests. Although the board has broad power to adopt governance
bylaws, shareholders do not enjoy analogous power. Accordingly, shareholders
are limited in their ability to constrain board actions with which they disagree.
This Part identifies several key limitations on shareholder power over the
corporation’s bylaws. The following Part considers the implications of these
limitations.
A. Substantive Limits on Shareholder Power Under Section 109
Although Boilermakers and ATP describe shareholder power to adopt and
amend bylaws under Delaware law as very broad, an earlier Delaware Supreme
Court decision, CA, Inc. v. AFSCME, suggests a more limited shareholder role.66
AFSCME, a union pension fund, submitted a shareholder proposal to amend the
bylaws pursuant to Rule 14a-8.67 The proposed bylaw required the issuer, under
certain circumstances, to reimburse reasonable proxy solicitation expenses
incurred by a stockholder who nominated one or more candidates for election to
the board of directors.68 CA sought to exclude the shareholder proposal from its
proxy statement on the basis that the proposed bylaw was not a proper subject
for shareholder action and, if adopted, would be illegal under DGCL section
141(a).69
In support of its request for no-action relief, CA submitted to the SEC an
opinion letter from Delaware counsel, arguing that the proposed bylaw was
invalid because it would interfere with the board’s authority under the statute and
the charter to manage the corporation.70 According to the letter, the board, not
the shareholders, had the discretion to determine how to expend corporate funds,
and the shareholders lacked the authority “unilaterally [to impose] limits on the
Board’s discretion.”71 The letter also argued that the bylaw would “impede the
Board’s exercise of its fiduciary duties to manage the business and affairs of the
Company.”72

66. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 229 (Del. 2008). Prior to
AFSCME, the position of the Delaware courts on this issue was less clear. See Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC
Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 407 (Del. 1985) (upholding shareholder-adopted bylaw amendments that
“required attendance of all directors for a quorum and unanimous approval of the board of directors
before board action can be taken . . . thereby limit[ing] the functioning of the Frantz board” even though
the amendments were intended to limit the board’s “anti-takeover maneuvering”).
67. AFSCME, 953 A.2d at 229; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2016).
68. AFSCME, 953 A.2d at 229–30.
69. No-Action Request from Richards, Layton & Finger, Counsel for CA, Inc., to SEC, Div. of
Corp. Fin. (Apr. 17, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2008/ca062708-14a8incoming.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9SJ-5Q49].
70. Id. at 3–4.
71. Id. at 7 n.3.
72. Id.
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The SEC sought guidance from the Delaware Supreme Court as to whether
CA’s argument was correct as a matter of Delaware corporate law.73 CA used
Delaware’s newly adopted certification procedure74 to certify two questions to
the Delaware Supreme Court:
1. Is the AFSCME Proposal a proper subject for action by
shareholders as a matter of Delaware law?
2. Would the AFSCME Proposal, if adopted, cause CA to violate
any Delaware law to which it is subject?75
In its decision, the court provided several guiding principles about the scope
of shareholder authority under section 109. First, and perhaps most importantly,
the court explicitly rejected the idea that shareholder power to adopt bylaws is
coextensive with that of the board of directors.76 Instead, the court explained that
shareholder power is limited by section 141(a), which provides the board, but
not the shareholders, with broad management power over the affairs of the
corporation.77 The court explained that a shareholder-adopted bylaw would be
invalid if it limited “the board’s management prerogatives under Section
141(a).”78
In AFSCME, the court offered guidance on the permissible scope of
shareholder bylaws in order to analyze the relationship between board authority
under section 141(a) and shareholder power under section 109.79 As a starting
point, the court recognized that the statutory language was only “marginally
73. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 231 (Del. 2008).
74. S.B. 62, 144th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2007).
75. AFSCME, 953 A.2d at 231.
76. “[I]n isolation, Section 109(a) could be read to make the board’s and the shareholders’
power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws identical and coextensive, but Section 109(a) does not exist in
a vacuum. It must be read together with 8 Del. C. § 141(a) . . . .” Id. at 232.
77. See id. (“No such broad management power is statutorily allocated to the shareholders.”).
78. Id. at 232. The court’s analysis drew on an argument that commentators had developed in
response to pill redemption bylaws. See, e.g., Lawrence Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and
Stockholder Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409 (1998). In the late 1990s,
institutional investors attempted to adopt bylaws to restrict a board’s use of a poison pill to resist a hostile
tender offer. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the Outcome
of Corporate Control Contests?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 605, 610–12 (1997) (describing efforts by
institutional investors to introduce pill redemption bylaws). The Delaware courts did not rule on the
validity of pill redemption bylaws. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Legality and Utility of the Shareholder
Rights Bylaw, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 866 (1998) (“No Delaware court has addressed the legality of
the shareholder rights bylaw.”). An Oklahoma court, however, upheld a bylaw requiring that the board
submit a pill to its shareholders for ratification. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., 975
P.2d 907, 908 (Okla. 1999). Commentators have argued that Delaware law espouses a board-centric
model of the corporation that is inconsistent with the Fleming decision and defended this model on
normative grounds. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 572 (2003) (reasoning both that the corporate form
involves the shareholders’ decision to delegate this control to the board and that this delegation is
efficient); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA
L. REV. 601, 627 (2006) (“[S]hareholder voting must be constrained in order to preserve the value of
authority.”).
79. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 232–33 (Del. 2008).
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helpful in determining what the Delaware legislature intended to be the lawful
scope of the shareholders’ power to adopt, amend and repeal bylaws.”80 Notably,
in contrast to the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act and Revised Uniform
Partnership Act, the Delaware corporate law statute does not contain any
language explicitly endorsing a contractual approach.81
The court went on to explain that the proper function of bylaws was to
address procedural issues rather than to mandate substantive business decisions.
This substance/procedure distinction could be used to demarcate the permissible
scope of a shareholder-adopted bylaw under Delaware law.82 Accordingly, the
court then framed its analysis of the first certified question as requiring it to
determine whether an expense reimbursement bylaw was “process-related.”83
The court concluded that it was. Although the bylaw concededly involved the
expenditure of corporate funds, the court reasoned that the expenditure was
related to maintaining the integrity of the electoral process. As a result, the bylaw
was a proper subject for shareholder action.
The substance/procedure distinction can be understood as a way to
determine when a shareholder-adopted bylaw impermissibly infringes upon
board authority under section 141(a).84 Because section 141(a) vests the board
with authority over substantive business decisions, a substantive bylaw could be
understood to usurp that authority. A bylaw that addresses the procedure by
which a decision is made but leaves the ultimate decision to the board, however,
would presumably be valid.85 The substance/procedure distinction thus creates a
different scope for board-adopted bylaws than for those adopted by shareholders
because the board is not limited to process bylaws.
The AFSCME court’s determination that the proxy reimbursement bylaw
was process-based, and therefore legally permissible, did not conclude the
analysis, however. The court went on to consider the second question—whether
the proposed bylaw would cause CA to violate Delaware law. The court
concluded that it would. Reasoning that the bylaw could, hypothetically, require
80. Id. at 234.
81. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2011) (“It is the policy of this chapter to give
the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract . . . .”).
82. AFSCME, 953 A.2d at 235 (“[T]here is a general consensus that bylaws that regulate the
process by which the board acts are statutorily authorized.”).
83. Id. at 236.
84. Commentators have suggested other approaches to analyzing this question. For example,
Ben Walther distinguishes between bylaws that attempt to circumscribe the managerial authority of the
board and those that attempt to control or bind the board. Ben Walther, Bylaw Governance, 20
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 399, 414–15 (2015). Jack Coffee offers four criteria for distinguishing
proper from improper shareholder bylaws: 1) bylaws that deal with fundamental versus ordinary matters;
2) bylaws that impose negative constraints as opposed to affirmative obligations; 3) bylaws that focus
on procedure rather than substance; and 4) bylaws that concern corporate governance rather than
business decisions. See Coffee, supra note 78, at 613–15.
85. See also Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1078–79 (Del. Ch. 2004) (stating that
there is a “general consensus that bylaws that regulate the process by which the board acts are statutorily
authorized”).
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the board to reimburse a stockholder’s proxy expenses in a situation in which
reimbursement would violate the board’s fiduciary duties, the court held that this
deficiency rendered the bylaw facially invalid.86
The court reached this conclusion by analogizing to situations in which
courts had invalidated contracts that imposed obligations on a board that
arguably were inconsistent with the board’s fiduciary duties.87 Although those
situations involved contractual obligations that the board had voluntarily
assumed, as opposed to obligations imposed by a shareholder-adopted bylaw,
the court found that “the distinction is one without a difference.”88 The court’s
rationale was that, in either case, the result would be to limit the board from
exercising the full scope of its managerial authority.89 Again, the touchstone of
the analysis was the board’s broad authority under section 141(a).90
Although the AFSCME decision has been criticized,91 and the Delaware
legislature subsequently amended the statute to authorize explicitly both proxy
expense reimbursement bylaws and proxy access bylaws,92 the principle that
shareholder authority under section 109 is more limited than director authority
appears to have survived. In a 2015 decision, Vice-Chancellor Noble invalidated
a bylaw that authorized shareholders to remove and replace corporate officers
without cause.93 Notably, the plaintiff in that case relied on statutory language
that seemed expressly to authorize bylaws that dealt with the appointment and
removal of corporate officers.94

86. The court explained that it was required to view the bylaw as inconsistent with the law if
there was “any possible circumstance under which a board of directors might be required to act [where]
the board of directors would breach their fiduciary duties if they complied with the Bylaw.” CA, Inc. v.
AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 238 (Del. 2008).
87. See id. (citing Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994)).
88. Id. at 239.
89. The extent to which the inclusion of a fiduciary out in the bylaw would address this concern
is an open issue. See Sabrina Ursaner, Note, Keeping “Fiduciary Outs” Out of Shareholder-Proposed
Bylaws: An Analysis of CA, Inc. v. AFSCME, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 479, 507–08 (2010).
90. Notably, however, the court suggested that the situation might be different if the limitation
had been imposed through a charter provision rather than a bylaw. See AFSCME, 953 A.2d at 240
(suggesting that shareholders might have recourse by seeking “to amend the Certificate of Incorporation
to include the substance of the Bylaw”). Because the scope of charter provisions is similarly limited to
what is permitted by the statute, it is unclear why using a charter provision instead of a bylaw would
affect the outcome. The distinction, however, motivated an argument by the plaintiffs in Boilermakers
that, to the extent that a forum selection provision was permissible, it had to be adopted through a charter
provision rather than a bylaw. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934,
955 n. 93 (Del. Ch. 2013). The court rejected that argument. Id.
91. See, e.g., Brett H. McDonnell, Bylaw Reforms for Delaware’s Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 651, 668 (2008).
92. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112, 113 (2017).
93. Gorman v. Salamone, No. 10183-VCN, 2015 De. Ch. LEXIS 202, at *18–19 (De. Ch.
July 31, 2015).
94. Id. at *13–14. See Paul M. Tiger & Carolyn Oh, Gorman v. Salamone: Delaware Court of
Chancery Strikes Down Bylaw Granting Stockholders the Right to Remove and Replace Officers,
CLEARY
M&A
&
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
WATCH
(Aug.
31,
2015),
http://www.clearymawatch.com/2015/08/gorman-v-salamone-delaware-court-of-chancery-strikes-
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Significantly, Vice-Chancellor Noble relied on the AFSCME decision for
the proposition that “[s]tockholders’ ability to amend bylaws is ‘not coextensive
with the board’s concurrent power and is limited by the board’s management
prerogatives under Section 141(a).’”95 He further held that the touchstone for
determining whether the bylaw infringed on the board’s management function
was the substance/procedure distinction developed by the AFSCME court.96
Applying this standard, he concluded that the bylaw was invalid because it
“would allow [shareholders] to make substantive business decisions for the
Company.”97
B. Additional Statutory Limits on Shareholder Power
Although AFSCME distinguished between shareholder and board power to
adopt and amend the bylaws, it is only one case. The extent to which future courts
will adhere to that distinction remains unclear.98 Still, the structure and language
of the Delaware corporation statute provide additional reasons to view the scope
of shareholder power under section 109 as limited.99 One notable feature of the
statute is that it contains a number of provisions expressly authorizing
shareholders to vote on bylaws that address particular issues. These provisions
include authorizing proxy expense reimbursement under section 112, providing
proxy access under section 113, classifying the board of directors under section
141(d), requiring majority voting under section 216, and opting out of the state
antitakeover statute under section 203(b)(3).
Although the statute does not contain any language indicating that the
shareholders may only adopt bylaws addressing subjects expressly authorized
therein, there are two possible reasons to read the list of explicit statutory
authorizations as limiting the scope of shareholder power. First, if, as section 109
implies, shareholders may adopt bylaws containing “any provision, not
inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the
business of the corporation,”100 the list of subject-specific authorizations would

down-bylaw-granting-stockholders-the-right-to-remove-and-replace-officers [https://perma.cc/68XM3M6B] (explaining Gorman decision). Section 142(b) provides: “Officers shall be chosen in such
manner and shall hold their offices for such terms as are prescribed by the bylaws or determined by the
board of directors or other governing body.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(b) (2017) (emphasis added).
95. Gorman, 2015 LEXIS 202, at *11 (quoting CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953
A.2d 227, 232 (Del. 2008)).
96. Id. at *1314 (holding that “valid bylaws focus on process”).
97. Id. at *6.
98. See also Walther, supra note 84, at 448 (arguing that AFSCME’s “influence may be
dwindling”).
99. See also James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U.
L. REV. 257, 291–92 (2015) (arguing that courts should “divert course from the deceptive nature of the
nexus-of-contracts approach and return to the corporate statute to divine the relative rights of the board
vis-à-vis the shareholders”).
100. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2017).
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be unnecessary.101 Consequently, under a formalistic approach to statutory
construction,102 the fact that the statute sets out a litany of subjects upon which a
shareholder-adopted bylaw is permitted implies that, in the absence of statutory
authorization, at least some types of shareholder-adopted bylaws are not
allowed.103
Second, the enabling provisions reinforce the idea that shareholder
authority over corporate affairs is limited and that all residual authority is vested
in the board of directors.104 This perspective is consistent with the argument
identified in the prior Part that board power to manage the corporation is
unlimited pursuant to section 141(a), but shareholders possess only those powers
expressly conferred by the statute. It is also consistent with a statutory structure
that confers specific and limited powers upon shareholders apart from their
power to adopt bylaws, vesting all remaining power in the board. For example,
the Delaware statute authorizes shareholders to vote on specific issues—election
of the board of directors, amendments to the certificate of incorporation, and
approval of mergers and other structural changes.105 Thus, the inclusion of
subject-specific shareholder bylaw authorization provisions and the general
enabling approach of Delaware corporate law with respect to board power
suggest that the scope of shareholder power is more limited than that of the
board.
An additional reason that shareholder authority under section 109 is limited
is that, in virtually all corporations, it is nonexclusive.106 Although shareholders
have the power to adopt and amend the bylaws, so does the board of directors.

101. Put differently, one could view a bylaw as inconsistent with the statute unless it deals with
a subject upon which a bylaw is expressly permitted.
102. Although Delaware adheres to the equal dignity doctrine, in which actions taken pursuant
to various statute sections constitute acts of independent legal significance, see Hariton v. Arco
Electronics, Inc., 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963), at least one commentator has noted that the equal dignity
rule may not be equally applicable to questions of shareholder power. See Larry E. Ribstein, Takeover
Defenses and the Corporate Contract, 78 GEO. L.J. 71, 117 n.253 (1989) (“Rules limiting directors’
powers play a different role in the economic structure of the firm than do rules limiting the power of the
majority of the shareholders.”).
103. See Hamermesh, supra note 78, at 444 (arguing that “as a matter of formal statutory
construction, then, it is preferable to read section 141(a) as an absolute preclusion against by-law limits
on director management authority, in the absence of explicit statutory authority for such limits outside
of section 109(b)”).
104. The structure is similar to the federalist system imposed by the U.S. Constitution in which
Congress has limited authority and all residual power remains with the states. See generally John Yoo,
The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1393 (1997) (“The Tenth Amendment
states that ‘the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.’”).
105. But see Bebchuk, supra note 23 (arguing that the scope of subjects upon which shareholders
can vote should be expanded).
106. See Hamermesh, supra note 78, at 417 n.27 (“This is thus an area in which the statutory
default rule in states like Delaware, New York, and Oklahoma—denying the directors the power to
adopt and amend by-laws—is sharply at odds with custom and practice.”).
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As a result, even if the shareholders adopt a bylaw, their action may be
overturned by the board.107
The Delaware statute contains provisions that explicitly protect a
shareholder-adopted bylaw from board repeal, but they are applicable only to a
few substantive issues. For example, DGCL section 216 provides that a
shareholder-adopted bylaw specifying the votes required for the election of
directors “shall not be further amended or repealed by the board of directors.”108
Absent language such as that found in section 216, it appears that the board of a
Delaware corporation is free to amend or repeal a shareholder-adopted bylaw
with which it disagrees.109
In contrast, it is unclear under Delaware law whether shareholders can
prevent the board from overturning a shareholder-adopted bylaw by including
language to that effect in a proposed bylaw.110 Indeed, the Delaware Supreme
Court stated in dictum that a shareholder-adopted bylaw that purported to be
insulated from board override would be void, reasoning that the limitation was
“in obvious conflict” with the directors’ “general authority to adopt or amend
corporate by-laws.”111 Relatedly, a Delaware court explicitly upheld a board’s
decision to repeal a critical bylaw even though the shareholders were about to
vote to reject the bylaw’s repeal.112 The court reasoned that the shareholders had
an appropriate remedy available in that they could call a special meeting, vote to
reinstate the bylaw, and then remove the offending directors.113
Delaware law differs in this regard from the Model Business Corporation
Act.114 The Model Act explicitly authorizes shareholders to insulate any
shareholder-adopted bylaw from board override, providing that “[a]
corporation’s board of directors may amend or repeal the corporation’s bylaws,
107. See id. at 416 (“Even if the stockholders could validly initiate and adopt a by-law limiting
the authority of the directors, such a by-law amendment would accomplish little or nothing if the board
of directors could simply repeal it after the stockholders adopted it.”).
108. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2017).
109. Vice-Chancellor Jacobs explicitly referenced the board’s power as a limitation on the
contractual approach in Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995). As he explained:
“[A]lthough the by-laws are a contract between the corporation and its stockholders, the contract was
subject to the board’s power to amend the by-laws unilaterally.” Id.
110. See L. John Bird, Comment, Stockholder and Corporate Board Bylaw Battles: Delaware
Law and the Ability of a Corporate Board to Change or Overrule Stockholder Bylaw Amendments, 11
U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 217, 219 (2008) (observing that the Delaware statute places “no express limits
on the application of such director amendment authority to stockholder-adopted by-laws”); see also In
re Pennzoil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 SEC No-Act LEXIS 304, at *1–2, 66 (Feb. 24, 1993)
(approving, on other grounds, exclusion of a shareholder-proposed bylaw amendment that included
language barring its repeal without shareholder approval).
111. Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat’l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 929 (Del. 1990). But see Am.
Int’l Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. Cross, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 413, at *9 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1984) (suggesting in
dictum that shareholders could amend the bylaws and remove the board’s power to amend the applicable
provision further).
112. Am. Int’l Rent-a-Car, Inc., 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 413, at *9.
113. Id.
114. Bird, supra note 110, at 219.
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unless . . . the shareholders in amending, repealing or adopting a bylaw expressly
provide that the board of directors may not amend, repeal, or reinstate that
bylaw.”115 As one commentator noted, Delaware could amend its statute to take
a similar approach, thereby increasing (or explicitly acknowledging) shareholder
power.116
On the other hand, a broadly construed board power to amend or repeal
shareholder-adopted bylaws might provide a solution to the question of
shareholder authority raised in AFSCME. To the extent that a board retains the
authority to repeal a shareholder-adopted bylaw that would infringe on its
managerial authority or cause it to violate its fiduciary duties, arguably that
power alone should save the bylaw from the infirmity identified in AFSCME. At
least at issuers for which the board has concurrent authority with the shareholders
to amend the bylaws, the board’s power to do so would seem to imply that a
shareholder-adopted bylaw could not infringe on board authority under section
141(a).
Then-Vice Chancellor Strine implicitly made this point in dictum in
General DataComm Industries v. Wisconsin Investment Board.117 In considering
whether a shareholder-proposed bylaw that prevented the board from repricing
options without shareholder approval was valid under Delaware law, he observed
that the board could repeal the offending bylaw at any time if it determined that
it was necessary to do so.118 Accordingly, he suggested that a bylaw might not
constrain board discretion in the same way as a poison pill that could not be
redeemed by a new board majority, which the court had previously rejected.119
Boards can also block shareholder efforts to insulate a bylaw from board
repeal by proactively adopting their own bylaw that does not preclude
subsequent board amendment. Boards at a number of issuers have used this
approach with respect to majority voting bylaws.120 Currently, under the laws of
115. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010).
116. Bird, supra note 110, at 229 (observing that Delaware “could adopt the relevant provisions
of the Model Business Corporation Act wholesale, giving shareholders the ability to adopt bylaws that
cannot be further amended by the board when so stated within the bylaw”). Alternatively, Delaware
could reinforce its director primacy position by explicitly granting the board the power to amend any
shareholder-adopted bylaw. See id. (“[T]he legislature could amend existing statutes to give the board
explicit power to amend or revoke shareholder adopted bylaw amendments.”).
117. Gen. DataComm Indus., Inc. v. State of Wis. Inv. Bd., 731 A.2d 818, 821 (Del. Ch. 1999)
(implying that the board had the power to repeal shareholder-adopted bylaws but noting that the law in
this area was unsettled).
118. Id. at 821 (footnotes omitted) (“It may be that GDC is correct in stating that the Repricing
Bylaw is obviously invalid under the teaching of Quickturn. But the question of whether a stockholderapproved bylaw that can potentially be repealed at any time by the GDC board of directors exercising
its business judgment, see 8 Del. C. § 109(a), is clearly invalid under the teaching of a case involving a
board-approved contractual rights plan precluding, by contract, a new board majority from redeeming
the rights under the plan until six months after election seems to me to be a question worthy of careful
consideration.”).
119. Id. (suggesting the possibility that the bylaw presented a situation that was distinguishable
from that in Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998)).
120. Mary Siegel, The Holes in Majority Voting, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 364, 374 (2011).
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many states, including Delaware, a shareholder-adopted majority voting bylaw
is insulated from board repeal.121 This restriction does not apply, however, to a
board-adopted majority voting bylaw. As a result, boards can avoid the
restriction on their power by adopting majority voting bylaws themselves.122 As
one commentator noted, “In so doing, directors doubly benefit: they not only
gain approval from shareholders who support majority voting, but the directors
have also assured themselves the opportunity to repeal, unilaterally, their own
bylaw.”123
A related issue is whether shareholders indeed have the power to amend or
repeal a board-adopted bylaw with which they disagree, as Strine suggested in
Boilermakers.124 The issue is potentially problematic to the extent that the
board’s bylaw authority is broader than that of the shareholders, as suggested in
AFSCME. If a board adopts a bylaw pursuant to its authority under section 141(a)
that the shareholders could not have adopted on their own, it is not clear that the
shareholders have the power to amend or repeal that bylaw. In other words, it is
plausible that AFSCME sets analogous limits on both shareholder power to adopt
bylaws and their power to amend or repeal board-adopted bylaws.125 Although
the Delaware courts have not had occasion to address this question, as
corporations increase their efforts at private ordering and shareholders become
more willing to challenge board-adopted governance measures, the issue is more
likely to arise.126
Shareholders, of course, have other ways of responding to an issuer’s
governance provisions. In particular, shareholders can discipline boards directly
by withholding support for directors or, if an issuer has majority voting, by
removing directors who adopt objectionable bylaws. While these methods have
been somewhat successful, they are not enough to close the existing gap between

121. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2017) (“A bylaw amendment adopted by
stockholders which specifies the votes that shall be necessary for the election of directors shall not be
further amended or repealed by the board of directors.”).
122. Siegel, supra note 120.
123. Id. at 374.
124. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 958 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(observing that “stockholders retain the right to modify the corporation’s bylaws”). Notably, prior to the
Boilermakers decision, shareholders at four issuers introduced non-binding proposals seeking to repeal
a board-adopted forum selection bylaw. Claudia Allen, Exclusive Forum Provisions: Putting on the
Brakes, CONF. BD. BLOG (Dec. 19, 2012), http://tcbblogs.org/governance/2012/12/19/exclusive-forumprovisions-putting-on-the-brakes [https://perma.cc/HD4K-VDBQ]. Only two of those proposals went
to a vote, and neither received the support of a majority of the shareholders. The other two companies
repealed their respective bylaws prior to a vote. Id.
125. Cf. Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Techs, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (holding
that, under Georgia corporate law, shareholders could not adopt a bylaw to overturn the “dead-hand”
provision of a poison pill because the law vested sole authority over the terms of a poison pill in the
board of directors).
126. Relatedly, shareholders have actively sought to overturn corporate charter provisions
establishing staggered boards, an endeavor aided by the Harvard Shareholder Rights Project. See Fisch,
supra note 10, at 1647 (describing Shareholder Rights Project).
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board and shareholder power. In addition, as will be discussed below, they are
vulnerable to practical problems.127
One of the most powerful options for shareholders is to withhold voting
support from director candidates who adopt or fail to repeal an objectionable
governance provision.128 The effectiveness of this approach has been enhanced
by the role of the major proxy advisory firms, ISS and Glass Lewis.129 These
firms have highlighted both unilateral board actions that reduce shareholder
rights and board failures to respond to shareholder demands,130 labeling them
critical factors influencing their recommendations with respect to director
elections.131 In response, shareholders take these recommendations very
seriously.132 For example, one commentator reported that, of the various reasons
for ISS issuing a negative recommendation with respect to a director candidate,
a “lack of ‘responsiveness’” is “clearly the most impactful.”133
A recent example demonstrates the potential effectiveness of shareholder
power to withhold votes in director elections. In 2013, ISS published a policy
position indicating its intention to recommend that shareholders withhold their
votes from directors who had adopted a director compensation bylaw limiting a
board candidate’s ability to receive compensation from a third party.134 So-called
“golden leash” bylaws were developed by the law firm Wachtell Lipton as a
response to compensation arrangements between activist hedge funds and their

127. See infra Part II.C.
128. Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections and the Role of Proxy
Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 660 (2009) (describing “withhold vote” campaigns by shareholders);
Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, Understanding Uncontested Director Elections, MGMT.
SCI. (forthcoming 2018) (providing empirical analysis of factors driving shareholders to withhold votes
in uncontested elections).
129. See Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or
Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 868 (2010) (finding that while proxy advisors enhance shareholder voting
power, their influence is often overstated).
130. See e.g., WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES, HEADS UP FOR 2015 PROXY SEASON: TWO PROXY
ADVISORY
FIRM
DEVELOPMENTS
(2014),
http://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/pcag_alert_nov2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V8SF-6LC9]
(describing ISS and Glass Lewis policies, adopted in 2015, of generally issuing “negative vote
recommendations against directors if the board amends the bylaws or charter without shareholder
approval in a manner that materially diminishes shareholder rights or otherwise impedes shareholder
ability to exercise their rights”); Ertimur et al, supra note 128, at 3 (reporting that of ISS board-level
withhold recommendations, “72.2 percent are due to lack of responsiveness to shareholder proposals
receiving a majority vote”).
131. See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, 2015 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 19–21 (2015) (describing
ISS’s practice of issuing withhold recommendations for unilateral board action and lack of
responsiveness).
132. Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Who Calls the Shots? How Mutual Funds
Vote on Director Elections, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 35 (2013).
133. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, supra note 131, at 21.
134. CHRIS CERNICH ET AL., ISS, WHEELING OUT THE PROCRUSTEAN BED: BYLAW
RESTRICTIONS ON DISSIDENT NOMINEE COMPENSATION 1 (2013).
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director nominees.135 Following ISS’s announcement, directors at Provident
Bank, the first issuer affected by the ISS position, received a withhold vote of
approximately 34 percent, an extremely high level of withhold votes.136 Within
the next six months, twenty-eight of the thirty-two issuers that had adopted
golden leash bylaws repealed them.137 Notably, the threat of shareholder voting
pressure was sufficient to cause the issuers in question to repeal their bylaws
without the need for litigation challenging the bylaws’ validity.
The impact of the shareholder vote on director elections has increased with
the advent of majority voting. Under traditional plurality voting, it was not
possible for shareholders to fail to elect a director candidate in an uncontested
election. Under majority voting, a director candidate must receive a majority of
votes cast, and a large against or withhold vote can require the director to tender
his or her resignation.138 Thus, majority voting theoretically gives real teeth to
the shareholders’ ability to vote on director elections.
Despite the fact that these tools exist and are increasing in importance, their
practical effect is limited. At issuers with plurality voting, a high withhold vote
remains symbolic and does not remove the director from the board. Even at the
substantial number of issuers that have adopted majority voting, the number of
directors who fail to receive a majority vote is very small and, of those, even
fewer wind up losing their jobs.139 Nor does it appear likely, given the high costs
involved, that shareholders would mount a proxy contest for the purpose of
removing or replacing directors who adopt a bylaw with which shareholders
disagree.140
More importantly, this tactic has limited utility because it is merely
responsive to board authority and does not truly empower shareholders to
participate actively in governance. Although shareholders can use their voting
power in director elections to apply pressure with respect to board-adopted
governance provisions, the ability to apply pressure in response to unwanted
board actions is not the equivalent of consenting to those actions. Given the
limitations above, the lack of sufficient mobilization in response to an

135. See Martin Lipton, Bylaw Protection Against Dissident Director Conflict/Enrichment
Schemes, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 10, 2013),
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/05/10/bylaw-protection-against-dissident-directorconflictenrichment-schemes [https://perma.cc/7GFF-2TGA] (proposing model golden leash bylaw).
136. Provident Fin. Holdings, Inc., Annual Meeting Results (Form 8-K) (Nov. 26, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1010470/000093905713000530/prov8kip112613.htm
[https://perma.cc/LTE5-5BQ9].
137. Cain et al., supra note 59, at 675–76.
138. See generally Choi et al., supra note 11 (describing majority voting).
139. Id. at 1122 (reporting that, between 2007 and 2013, only eight directors failed to receive a
majority of “for” votes at issuers with majority voting and that, of those, only three left the board
following the election).
140. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 210 (2008) (noting that proxy contests are “enormously expensive”).
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objectionable bylaw does not mean that shareholders have otherwise consented
to its adoption.
Finally, in some states, there is an even greater power gap between boards
and shareholders than in Delaware. Boilermakers is premised on the fact that,
under Delaware law, shareholder authority to amend the bylaws cannot be
eliminated.141 Not every state corporation statute is similar. In some states, a
corporation can be structured so that directors have exclusive authority to amend
the bylaws. In Texas, for example, a corporation may eliminate shareholder
authority to amend the bylaws through an appropriate provision in its charter.142
In Maryland, a corporation can grant the power to the board, the shareholders, or
both.143 Indeed, following the Fleming decision, the Oklahoma legislature
amended its corporation statute to provide as a default rule that only the board of
directors has the power to amend or repeal the corporation’s bylaws, although a
corporation may voluntarily grant this power to the shareholders as well.144 The
Indiana statute is similar.145
Even in states in which corporations cannot eliminate shareholders power
to adopt or amend the bylaws, this power may be restricted to certain types of
governance provisions. For example, although Delaware authorizes shareholders
to amend the bylaws to adopt majority voting,146 as of 2011, only nineteen states
allowed shareholder-adopted majority voting bylaws without prior charter
authorization or board approval.147 In summary, to the extent that either state law
or firm-specific provisions limit shareholders authority to adopt, amend, and
repeal the bylaws in whole or in part, an essential predicate of Boilermakers’
contractual approach is missing.
C. Practical Limits to Shareholder Power
In addition to legal limits on shareholder power to act through the adoption
and amendment of the bylaws, shareholders also face practical limits on their
power to implement changes to the bylaws. Indeed, as Strine has noted, the

141. Other courts have relied on the Boilermakers decision to apply a contractual approach to
governance issues involving Delaware corporations. See, e.g., In re CytRx Corp. Stockholder Derivative
Litig., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176966, *13 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2015) (“There is no question after
Boilermakers that a forum-selection bylaw unilaterally adopted by a Delaware corporation’s board of
directors is facially valid under Delaware contract and corporate law.”); North v. McNamara, 47 F. Supp.
3d 635, 642 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (same).
142. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.057(c) (West 2015) (“A corporation’s board of directors
may amend or repeal bylaws or adopt new bylaws unless: (1) the corporation’s certificate of formation
or this code wholly or partly reserves the power exclusively to the corporation’s shareholders . . . .”).
143. MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. § 2-109(b) (West 2013).
144. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1013 (2015).
145. IND. CODE § 23-1-39-1 (2017) (“Unless the articles of incorporation or section 4 of this
chapter provide otherwise, only a corporation’s board of directors may amend or repeal the corporation’s
bylaws.”).
146. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2017).
147. Siegel, supra note 120, at 371–72.
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“practical realities of stock market ownership have changed in ways that deprive
most stockholders of both their right to voice and their right of exit.” 148 Strine
and Walter have termed this a “separation of ownership from ownership.”149
Many shareholders hold their stock through institutional intermediaries such as
pension funds and mutual funds, in which the power to vote rests in the hands of
the institutional agent. Moreover, there are reasons to believe that institutional
investors’ voting preferences, which dominate the voting results, differ from
those of retail investors.150
The standard collective action problem poses another practical limit.151 An
extensive literature observes that because shareholders of US public companies
are dispersed, they face costs when they seek to act collectively, and they must
typically bear those costs personally, unlike directors.152 The rise of shareholder
activism and the impact of intermediaries such as ISS have dramatically reduced
these costs.153 In addition, activist hedge funds have taken on a role as
governance intermediaries. Hedge funds can identify governance failures and
then mobilize traditionally passive institutional investors to respond to those
failures.154 Nonetheless, governance issues are rarely of sufficiently high value
to attract the interest of hedge fund activists. Rather, recent work supports the
conclusion that hedge fund activism is focused largely on other areas, such as
sale, capital structure, and corporate strategy.155

148. Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between
Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 370 (2015).
149. Id. at 340 (quoting Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground?
Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate
Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2007)).
150. See Jill E. Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail Investor,
102 MINN. L. REV. 51 (2017) (describing low voting turnout by retail investors and concern that retail
shareholders have different voting preferences from institutional investors).
151. See, e.g., Kelli A. Alces, The Equity Trustee, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 717, 722–35 (2010)
(describing the collective action problem among shareholders).
152. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 78, at 613 (“Collective action problems preclude the
shareholders from exercising meaningful day-to-day or even year-to-year control over managerial
decisions.”); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA.
L. REV. 247, 312 (1999) (“[S]hareholders still face collective action problems [making it] always
extremely difficult, and often impossible, for shareholders to use their rights to vote on fundamental
changes to oppose a transaction or policy the board favors.”); Stephen Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How To Fix
Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 271
(2003) (“[S]hareholder collective action is rare, even though it may benefit shareholders as a group.”).
153. See Cain et al., supra note 59 (using the golden leash as an example of an intermediary
acting to reduce collective action costs); supra notes 129–133 and accompanying text (discussing proxy
advisors).
154. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 862, 897 (2013) (describing
activists as “arbitraging governance rights that become more valuable through their activity monitoring
companies to identify strategic opportunities and then presenting them to institutional investors for their
approval”).
155. C.N.V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, The Second Wave of Hedge Fund
Activism: The Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise, 40 J. CORP. FIN. 296 (2016).
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In addition, supermajority voting requirements at specific issuers may
heighten the collective action problem by raising the threshold required to amend
or repeal a board-adopted bylaw.156 Delaware law allows a corporation to require
“a supermajority vote for adopting any subsequent bylaw amendment.”157 It is
common for corporations to adopt supermajority voting requirements for some
or all shareholder actions.158 IPO charters increasingly contain supermajority
provisions—88 percent of IPO charters in 2015 contained supermajority
provisions.159 Although the incidence of these requirements has declined in S&P
500 companies, approximately 30 percent retained a supermajority requirement
in 2013.160 Notably, if an issuer’s charter contains a supermajority requirement,
that requirement can only be repealed by that same supermajority.161

156. See, e.g., Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN.
L. REV. 1325, 1348 (2013) (“[C]harters commonly contain provisions that deter shareholders from
amending bylaws—for instance, with supermajority vote requirements.”).
157. Stephen M. Gill, Kai Haakon, E. Liekefett & Leonard Wood, Structural Defenses to
Shareholder Activism, 47 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 151, 155 (2014); see DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 102(b)(4) (2017) (authorizing charter provision to require the vote “of a larger portion of the stock . . .
than is required by this chapter); Id. § 216 (authorizing corporations to specify the required vote for
shareholder action and providing that, in the absence of a specific provision, the required threshold is
“the majority of shares present in person or represented by proxy”). Other state statutes are similar. See,
e.g., Scott Hirst, Frozen Charters, 34 YALE J. REG. 91, 100 (2017) (“Each state permits a corporation to
require a greater vote requirement . . . in order to approve an amendment to important parts of the
charter.”).
158. Hirst, supra note 157, at 125 n.127 (reporting that, in author’s sample of Russell 3000
companies, “[41.9 percent had] supermajority provisions to amend one or more provisions of their
bylaws”).
159. See
WILMERHALE,
2016
M&A
REPORT
4
(2016),
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/2016WilmerHale-MA-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9GM-Z54N]. The reported data included only
Delaware corporations and included those containing supermajority requirements “to approve mergers
or change corporate charter and bylaws.” Id.
160. See Gill et al., supra note 157, at 156 n.37 (noting that this number reflects a decline from
67.62 percent in 2003). The number of issuers with supermajority requirements continues to decline,
however, as shareholder proposals asking issuers to repeal supermajority requirements have been fairly
common in recent years. See, e.g., Holly Gregory, Hot Topics for the 2016 Proxy Season, PRACTICAL
LAW,
Oct.
2015,
at
30,
33–34,
http://www.sidley.com/~/media/publications/oct15_governancecounselor.pdf [https://perma.cc/2H8ZFNL7] (identifying “elimination or reduction of supermajority vote requirements” as one of the types of
shareholder proposals receiving the highest average level of shareholder support in 2015 and observing
that “[e]limination of supermajority provisions to amend by-laws” was likely to “continue to be a focus
of 2016 shareholder proposals”).
161. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(4) (2017) (“Whenever the certificate of incorporation shall
require for action . . . by the holders of any class or series of shares or by the members, or by the holders
of any other securities having voting power the vote of a greater number or proportion than is required
by any section of this title, the provision of the certificate of incorporation requiring such greater vote
shall not be altered, amended, or repealed except by such greater vote.”); see also Illumina Inc., SEC
No-Action
Letter,
2016
SEC
No-Act.
LEXIS
245
(Mar.
18,
2016),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2016/mcritchieyoung031816-14a8.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A9N7-ZZ8H] (upholding Illumina’s effort to exclude shareholder proposal seeking to
repeal majority voting requirement on the basis that the proposal conflicted with the board’s proposal to
retain the supermajority requirement).
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Although shareholders can, in theory, obtain the necessary votes to adopt
or amend a bylaw even in a corporation with a supermajority voting requirement,
such a requirement heightens the collective action problem. As Scott Hirst has
documented, voter turnout varies substantially among issuers.162 Many issuers
regularly experience turnout levels that are below the supermajority
thresholds.163 The problem of insufficient voter turnout has been exacerbated by
the virtual elimination of discretionary voting by brokers.164
The impact of supermajority requirements is exacerbated by the standard
vote-counting methodology.165 According to a recent study, more than half of
large public companies count abstentions with respect to shareholder proposals
as “no” votes.166 Because a shareholder-initiated bylaw amendment must
necessarily take the form of a shareholder proposal, this methodology has the
effect of allowing issuers to treat some shareholder proposals as failing even if
they receive a majority of votes cast.167 The study found sixty-three shareholdersponsored proposals between 2004 and 2014 that issuers identified as failing but
that would have passed under a so-called “simple majority” formula.168 A
responsive shareholder initiative has been to file resolutions seeking to have
issuers shift to the simple majority approach that would eliminate abstentions
from the vote count.169
162. Hirst, supra note 157.
163. See id. at 102 (documenting that, in Russell 3000 companies in 2013, “almost 50% of
meetings had turnout below 80% of shares outstanding”).
164. Historically, according to NYSE and Nasdaq rules, brokers were able to exercise voting
power for shares they held as custodians if the beneficial owners did not submit voting instructions.
Changes to those rules have greatly reduced that power and resulted in an increased number of shares
not being voted. See Fisch, supra note 150, at 26–27 (describing amendments to NYSE and Nasdaq
rules reducing the scope of issues on which brokers can exercise discretionary voting authority with
respect to uninstructed shares).
165. This methodology may not be consistent with the applicable statutes in all states. See, e.g.,
Abbott Labs., SEC No-Action Letter, 2016 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 79, at *10–20 (Jan. 29, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2016/kennethsteinerabbott012916-14a8.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2G4H-3VSL] (SEC inquiry from Abbott Labs., Inc., arguing that a simple majority
approach was invalid under Ill. Bus. Corp. Act Section 7.60, which provides that shareholder action
requires the affirmative vote of a majority of the shares represented at the meeting and entitled to vote
on a matter). The language of the Delaware statute is similar to that of the Illinois statute. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 216(2) (2017) (“In all matters other than the election of directors, the affirmative vote of
the majority of shares present in person or represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on
the subject matter shall be the act of the stockholders.”).
166. See INVESTOR VOICE, SIMPLE-MAJORITY STANDARD FOR USE IN CORPORATE PROXIES
(2015), http://www.investorvoice.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Vote-Counting_Synopsis_Version9e_2015.0315.pdf [https://perma.cc/AUS8-34FR] (describing simple majority formula).
167. Bruce Herbert, Simple Majority Vote Counting Initiative for Proxies, CORP. GOVERNANCE
(Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.corpgov.net/2015/03/simple-majority-vote-counting-initiative-for-proxies
[https://perma.cc/ZCR2-VH4D].
168. INVESTOR VOICE, supra note 166, at 2.
169. Gregory J. Millman, Why Shareholder Proposals Win More Votes, Lose Anyway, WALL ST.
J. (Mar. 20, 2015, 10:32 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/03/20/why-shareholderproposals-win-more-votes-lose-anyway/?mod=WSJ_hps_sections_riskcompliance
[https://perma.cc/92YB-YTMZ]. To date these proposals have received limited shareholder support.

398

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:373

A final practical impediment to shareholder power is the SEC’s
gatekeeping role. Shareholder resolutions seeking to amend the bylaws are
typically, albeit not inevitably, presented to the issuer in the form of Rule 14a-8
shareholder proposals.170 It is commonplace for issuers to seek SEC approval to
exclude from the proxy statement shareholder proposals that they do not
support.171 One basis for excluding a shareholder proposal is if that proposal, if
implemented, would cause the issuer to violate state law.172 This leaves the SEC
staff in the awkward position of attempting to determine the scope of shareholder
bylaw authority despite the fact that, as noted above in Part II.A, Delaware law
is somewhat unclear on the issue.173
Delaware amended its constitution in 2007 to permit the SEC to certify
questions regarding Delaware corporate law to the state supreme court.174
Although the SEC used the certification procedure in AFSCME,175 it is not
required to do so, and the Delaware Supreme Court is not required to accept the
SEC’s request for a ruling.176 As a result, the SEC staff is repeatedly called upon
to determine whether a shareholder-proposed bylaw is permissible, with only the
submissions of the proponent and the issuer to guide it in making that

See, e.g., Shirley Westcott, 2016 Proxy Season Review, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE &
FIN. REG. (Aug. 11, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/08/11/2016-proxy-season-review-2
[https://perma.cc/QP2X-7V27] (“[T]he eight resolutions that came to a vote averaged only single-digit
(7.9%) support.”).
170. See Donna Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action
Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 938 (1998)
(discussing no-action letters relating to shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8). A shareholder may
mount an independent proxy solicitation seeking to amend the bylaws, but, given the costs of such a
solicitation, shareholders are unlikely to do so outside of the control context. Cf. Airgas, Inc. v. Air
Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1187 (Del. 2010) (describing Air Product’s proposal of three bylaw
amendments in conjunction with a proxy contest “[a]s part of its takeover strategy”).
171. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(j) (2017) (designating required procedures for issuer seeking to
exclude a shareholder proposal); see Alan Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed
Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879, 886–92 (1994) (explaining the no-action
process).
172. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(j)(2) (2017).
173. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Bylaw Barricades: Unions and Shareholder Rights, N.Y.L.J., Mar.
1997, at 31 (observing that, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters General Fund v. Fleming
Companies, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2980 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 24, 1997), “the district court read SEC Rule
14a-8 very differently than the SEC has read that rule on shareholder proposals in recent years and
determined that a mandatory bylaw amendment was a proper subject under state law”).
174. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8), amended by 76 Del. Laws 2007, ch. 37, § 1 (effective May 3,
2007).
175. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 229 n.1 (Del. 2008)); see also
No-Action Request, supra note 69, at 3 (arguing that a proxy reimbursement proposal should be
excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(2)).
176. See, e.g., Junis L. Baldon, Note, Taking a Backseat: How Delaware Can Alter the Role of
the SEC in Evaluating Shareholder Proposals, 4 OHIO ST. BUS. L.J. 101, 121–22 (2009) (“The
opportunity still exists for the SEC to go astray and continue to issue pronouncement [sic] of state law
with minimal state guidance.”).
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determination.177 Although a full analysis of the staff’s approach to this question
is beyond the scope of this Article,178 it is clear that the procedure has the
practical effect of preventing many proposed bylaws from being presented to the
shareholders.179
III.
SOLUTIONS TO RENDER THE CONTRACTUAL MODEL MORE WORKABLE
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the shareholder power to act
through the adoption, amendment, and repeal of the bylaws is, for a variety of
reasons, less expansive than board power. As a result, the level of judicial
deference reflected in Boilermakers and ATP—deference that is based on the
contractual theory—may be inappropriate. In particular, board-adopted
governance provisions may not merit limited oversight because their adoption
does not adhere to contractual principles, as discussed above. If shareholders lack
the power to block or overturn provisions with which they disagree, the courts
should not presume that shareholders have consented to these provisions.
Two alternative solutions are possible. One approach is to remediate the
failure of existing law to conform with the contractual metaphor by increasing
shareholder power. If shareholder authority to adopt, amend, and repeal
corporate bylaws were commensurate with board authority, the corporate bylaws
would more closely resemble the theoretical contract envisioned in
Boilermakers. Shareholder empowerment, however, raises normative concerns
and creates tension with the board-centric model of Delaware corporate law.
177. An issuer seeking exclusion under this provision is required to submit a supporting opinion
from counsel. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(j)(2)(iii) (2017).
178. For a more detailed analysis and an argument that the SEC should adopt a policy of refusing
to exclude shareholder proposals on the basis that they violate state law, see Christopher Bruner,
Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad Approach to the Shareholder Bylaw Debate, 36 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 1, 43 (2011).
179. The Wall Street Journal reported that, during the 2017 proxy season, issuers submitted 288
requests to exclude a shareholder proposal, and the SEC staff granted 78 percent of such requests.
Tatyana Shumsky, SEC Lets More Companies Ignore Shareholder Proposals in 2017, WALL ST. J. (July
7, 2017) https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-lets-more-companies-ignore-shareholder-proposals-in2017-1499447145 [https://perma.cc/E8DQ-4PUR]. See, e.g., Scott’s Liquid Gold-Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 2013 SEC No-Act LEXIS 383, at *1, 4 (May 7, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cfnoaction/14a-8/2013/michaeldeutschrecon050713-14a8.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6LY-5MFT] (allowing
exclusion of a proposal on the basis that it impermissibly limited the board’s authority by mandating
specified disclosures); Pfizer Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 SEC No-Act LEXIS 161, at *1 (Feb.
22, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2012/donaldvuchetich02221214a8.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9RY-C6WN] (allowing exclusion of proposed dispute resolution bylaw);
Vail Resorts, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 SEC No-Act LEXIS 492, at *1 (Sep. 16, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2011/jeffreydoppel091611-14a8.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5QTY-KXT4] (approving exclusion of stockholder proposal to amend the bylaws to
“make distributions to stockholders a higher priority than debt repayment or asset acquisition”);
Monsanto Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 SEC No-Act LEXIS 746 (Nov. 7, 2008),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2008/harringtoninvestments121808-14a8.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TQ6Y-G4D9] (concurring with exclusion of stockholder proposal to amend the
bylaws to require directors to take an oath of allegiance to the U.S. Constitution).
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Accordingly, an alternative approach would be for courts to recognize the limits
of the contract analogy and to scrutinize board-adopted bylaws more closely.
This Article draws upon the Delaware Supreme Court’s Unocal decision180 to
develop a framework for enhanced judicial scrutiny of such bylaws.
A. Invigorating the Corporate Contract Through Increased Shareholder
Empowerment
Strine is undoubtedly correct in observing that the courts have little reason
to interfere with governance terms that are freely adopted by the corporation’s
participants. Private ordering is consistent with Delaware’s enabling approach to
corporate law, as well as the widely held expectation that market discipline will
lead issuers to adopt governance terms that are value-enhancing.181 Private
ordering offers market participants the opportunity to overcome informational
issues that limit regulators’ ability to identify optimal governance structures. It
also offers firms individualized tailoring that enables them to vary their
governance structures to reflect firm-specific characteristics.182 The problem
with private ordering under Delaware corporate law is that the board’s control
over governance terms is far greater than that of the shareholders, and the board,
acting alone, may fail to select optimal governance structures for a variety of
reasons.183
One possible solution is to modify Delaware law to level the playing field,
granting shareholders greater authority to engage in private ordering. The
Delaware legislature could choose to do so by reducing or eliminating the
limitations on shareholder power to adopt and amend the bylaws described in
this Article. It could, for example, amend the corporate statute, either broadly to
endorse shareholder power or more narrowly to remove specific existing
obstacles to the exercise of that power. Taking the broad approach, the legislature
could reconcile the existing tension between sections 109 and 141(a) by
providing that, notwithstanding section 141(a), shareholders have the power to
adopt any bylaw, substantive or procedural, relating to the business and affairs
180. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
181. See, e.g., Barry Baysinger & Henry Butler, Race for the Bottom v. Climb to the Top: The
ALI Project and Uniformity in Corporate Law, 10 J. CORP. L. 431, 446–49 (1985) (characterizing this
position as that of the “corporate federalists”).
182. See Daniel M. Gallagher, Commissioner Gallagher Discusses Federal Preemption of State
Corporate
Governance,
CLS
BLUE
SKY
BLOG
(Apr.
7,
2014)
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2014/04/07/commissioner-gallagher-discusses-federal-preemptionof-state-corporate-governance [https://perma.cc/FE9Y-3YVG] (describing the Dodd-Frank Act’s
federalization of corporate governance as a “one-size-fits-none model”); see also David F. Larcker &
Allan L. Mccall, Proxy Advisers Don’t Help Shareholders, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8 2013, 6:51 PM)
https://www.wsj.com/articles/proxy-advisers-don8217t-help-shareholdersproxy-advisers-don8217thelp-shareholders-1386530835 [https://perma.cc/7S28-JME6] (terming proxy advisor’s one-size-fitsall governance practices “best guesses”).
183. See Michal Barzuza, Do Heterogeneous Firms Select Their Right “Size” of Corporate
Governance Arrangements? (Va. L. & Econ. Research Working Paper No. 16, 2016) (arguing that
agency problems interfere with firms’ selection of efficient governance provisions).
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of the corporation.184 Such a provision would make clear that both parties to the
corporate contract—the shareholders and the board—have equal power to
choose the contract terms. Alternatively, the legislature could amend the
corporation statute to mirror the LLC and limited partnership statutes, which
explicitly give maximum effect to freedom of contract. A more tailored approach
could address the relative authority of the board and the shareholders with
respect to a particular bylaw about which they disagree. For example, the
legislature might amend the statute to provide explicit authority for the
shareholders to amend or repeal a board-adopted bylaw by simple majority vote.
Similarly, the statute could follow the Model Business Corporations Act
approach discussed above and preclude the board from amending or repealing a
shareholder-adopted bylaw.
Statutory changes such as those outlined above would add useful clarity to
the issue of shareholders’ bylaw power, but legislative action is not necessary.
The Delaware courts created the existing tension between sections 109 and
141(a), and they have the power to reread the statute to eliminate that tension.
The Delaware courts are famous for their incremental and context-specific
approach to corporate law,185 and for their sensitivity to market and institutional
developments that warrant a reconsideration of their prior precedents.186 As
noted above, the AFSCME decision’s narrow approach to shareholder bylaw
power might be ripe for such reconsideration considering recent developments
in the exercise of shareholder power. Investor activism has increased, including
the growing use by institutional investors of shareholder proposals to introduce
bylaw amendments relating to governance structures. Such amendments include
the implementation of majority voting and proxy access. These changes should
prompt the court to reconsider shareholder power to adopt and amend bylaws.187
The question of whether to increase shareholder power in this way to
support a contractual approach to evaluating the validity of corporate bylaws
raises important normative considerations, however. In particular, whether
184. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 234 (Del. 2008) (noting that
the existing statutory language is “only marginally helpful in determining what the Delaware legislature
intended to be the lawful scope of the shareholders’ power to adopt, amend and repeal bylaws”).
185. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1079 (2000) (noting the Delaware courts’ willingness to
reconsider their prior precedents rather than adhering to strong principles of stare decisis).
186. See, e.g., Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015); In re Trulia, Inc.
Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016); see also Fisch, supra note 185, at 1079.
187. Although the Delaware courts rarely overrule corporate law precedents directly, the case
law reflects a variety of areas in which the courts have announced a new approach that reflects a
substantial departure from that taken in previous cases. See, e.g., Corwin, 125 A.3d at 311 (imposing
limits on the scope of the court’s prior decisions in Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009),
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)); Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006)
(clarifying that the “obligation to act in good faith does not establish an independent fiduciary duty that
stands on the same footing as the duties of care and loyalty,” despite the court’s prior articulation of a
duty of good faith in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006)).
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Delaware law should be modified to increase shareholder power is controversial.
On the one hand, greater shareholder power can enable shareholders to monitor
management more effectively. Some commentators further view shareholder
power as an inherent right of stock ownership. For example, Lucian Bebchuk
proposed that corporate law grant shareholders the authority to “initiate and
adopt any rules-of-the-game decisions.”188 Bebchuk would go so far as to enable
shareholders to initiate charter amendments and reincorporation decisions.189 His
view, consistent with the analysis in the preceding Part of this Article, is that
existing law precludes shareholders from adopting value-increasing governance
arrangements that management disfavors.190
Similarly, Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright, and Marcus Kai Hintze have
broadly defended the value of private ordering and argued in favor of changes to
the Delaware statute, case law, and Rule 14a-8 that would “enhance the ability
of shareholders in public corporations to contract with shareholder bylaws.”191
Brett McDonnell observed that expansive shareholder bylaw power can be
justified by the fact that the bylaws are the main source for shareholder initiatives
to shape corporate governance without board approval.192 Accordingly, he
proposed four statutory changes designed to increase shareholder power.193
However, there are reasons to be cautious about this response. Although
shareholder empowerment may provide benefits to the corporation, it also has
its costs. Bill Bratton and Michael Wachter articulated one of the more powerful
positions against shareholder empowerment, arguing that it is likely to cause
managers to manage to the market—problematic because it creates an incentive
for excessive risk-taking.194 Greater shareholder empowerment is also in tension
with the board-centric model of the corporation.195 Stephen Bainbridge
challenged Bebchuk’s argument for greater shareholder power by identifying a
variety of efficiency benefits that result from the separation of ownership and
control.196 Commentators have also warned that shareholder empowerment

188. Bebchuk, supra note 23, at 865; see also id. at 871 (proposing to “empower shareholders in
public corporations by facilitating their ability to contract”).
189. Id. at 913.
190. Id. at 845–46.
191. Smith et al., supra note 31, at 188.
192. McDonnell, supra note 91, at 656.
193. Id. at 665. McDonnell’s suggestions included codifying the substance/procedure distinction,
providing that shareholder-adopted bylaws may limit board discretion, explicitly authorizing
shareholders to adopt bylaws dealing with poison pills, and providing that the board cannot amend a
shareholder bylaw. Id.
194. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 23, at 657–61.
195. Stephen Bainbridge is best known for arguing that shareholders’ interests are best served by
empowering the board of directors as a strong central authority, a model he termed “Director Primacy.”
Bainbridge, supra note 78, at 557–59.
196. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response to Increasing Shareholder Power: Director Primacy and
Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1735 (2006). Board primacy can also be
justified for a number of pragmatic reasons. For example, as Jeff Gordon has observed, increased
shareholder power may be misused due to the “risks of pathologies in shareholder voting and because
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creates a risk of self-dealing or interest group behavior because shareholders,
unlike directors, do not usually owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and their
fellow shareholders.197 Finally, to the extent that contractual freedom is valueenhancing, business participants can obtain that freedom by selecting alternative
business forms such as the LLC. By retaining the managerial approach in
corporate law, Delaware thus offers businesses a range of structural options.
The preceding arguments offer reasons to be cautious about embracing
shareholder empowerment in order to justify application of the contractual
approach. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to assess the relative
costs and benefits of increased shareholder empowerment, Delaware need not
level the contractual playing field. The courts could instead reduce their reliance
on the contractual model and impose greater scrutiny on board-adopted bylaws.
The next Section considers that alternative.
B. The Alternative: Increased Judicial Oversight
Because leveling the playing field with respect to corporate bylaws would
increase shareholder empowerment, those favoring director primacy are likely to
reject that approach. If Delaware law continues to limit the scope of shareholder
bylaw authority, the alternative is for courts to engage in greater judicial
oversight of board-adopted governance terms.
Increased judicial oversight of board-adopted governance bylaws could be
workable. Indeed, existing case law offers a model that could readily be extended
to the New Governance: the analytical approach developed in the Unocal case.198
In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court announced a new framework requiring
courts to apply enhanced scrutiny when reviewing board-adopted antitakeover
devices. The test involves a two-part inquiry encompassing both reasonableness
and proportionality.199 First, the “directors must show that they had reasonable
grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness exist[s]

of the chance that shareholders could use such initiative power to extract private gains.” Jeffrey N.
Gordon, “Just Say Never?” Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay
for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 547 (1997).
197. See, e.g., Frederick H. Alexander & James D. Honaker, Power to the Franchise or the
Fiduciaries?: An Analysis of the Limits on Stockholder Activist Bylaws, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 749, 755
(2008) (“[S]tockholders cannot use their statutory power to adopt bylaws to make management
decisions: because stockholders do not owe fiduciary duties to the other stockholders.”); Iman Anabtawi,
Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 564 (2006)
(“[S]hareholders . . . may use any incremental power conferred upon them to pursue those interests to
the detriment of shareholders as a class.”).
198. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
199. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1374 (Del. 1995) (describing “Unocal’s
reasonableness and proportionality review”).
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. . . .”200 Second, the board’s response must be “reasonable in relation to the threat
posed.”201
The same enhanced scrutiny, which might be understood as an
intermediate-level review, can be applied to the board’s unilateral adoption202 of
a governance provision that materially diminishes shareholder rights.203 First, the
court would consider whether the board reasonably believed that the provision
was necessary to address a threat to the corporation. Second, the court would
determine whether the provision was a proportional response to that threat. If the
governance provision meets these standards, the court would uphold its adoption.
In evaluating the nature of the threat, the courts should consider the subject
matter of the bylaw with two principles in mind. First, in keeping with the
rationale for director primacy, the courts should more readily accept actions
designed to protect the board’s discretion with respect to decisions that are “so
fundamental to management’s ability to run a company on a day-to-day basis
that they could not, as a practical matter, be subject to direct shareholder
oversight.”204 The case for shareholder authority is less compelling with respect
to management’s basic business choices.205 Second, the courts should be mindful
that the right of shareholders to elect directors freely is a fundamental basis for
the legitimacy of director primacy.206 Accordingly, bylaws that materially
interfere with that election power require greater justification.
A few examples demonstrate the application of this intermediate-level
scrutiny to common types of board-adopted bylaws and illustrate how this
200. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
201. Id. The Unocal court identified a third factor that “the directors may not have acted solely
or primarily out of a desire to perpetuate themselves in office.” Id. This factor has played a more limited
role in subsequent analysis of Unocal. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d
1334, 1344 (Del. 1987) (concluding that the third factor was satisfied where “[t]he Newmont board acted
to maintain the company’s independence and not merely to preserve its own control”).
202. The approach advocated by this Article applies specifically to unilateral board action. This
Article does not take a position on whether this level of judicial oversight is necessary or appropriate for
provisions that are subject to shareholder approval, such as a charter amendment or shareholder-ratified
bylaw.
203. This language is taken from the policy positions of the proxy advisory firms, ISS and Glass
Lewis, which have adopted such a standard in deciding whether to recommend against the election of a
director candidate. See WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES, HEADS UP FOR THE 2016 PROXY SEASON: ISS
AND
GLASS
LEWIS
UPDATE
THEIR
VOTING
POLICIES
(2015),
https://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/revised-pcag-alert--112315.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8NHWLYA9]; Ellen Odoner & Lyuba Goltser, ISS and Glass Lewis Updated 2016 Voting Policies, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Dec. 2, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/12/02/issand-glass-lewis-updated-2016-voting-policies [https://perma.cc/ZJZ9-4LSS] (describing updates to ISS
and Glass Lewis policies).
204. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, SEC Release No. 23200, 1998 WL
254809, at *4 (May 21, 1998).
205. Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 348 (3d Cir. 2015) (finding that
management, rather than shareholders, are best positioned to determine which products to sell—a basic
business choice).
206. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“The shareholder
franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”).
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approach focuses on existing power dynamics more effectively than contractual
analysis. The first example is forum selection bylaws such as the bylaw at issue
in the Boilermakers case. Boards have adopted forum selection bylaws in
response to the growth of shareholder litigation, particularly M&A litigation.207
Forum selection bylaws seek to limit the need for a corporation to defend itself
against lawsuits in multiple courts based on a single transaction.208
Because the vast majority of forum selection bylaws are adopted
unilaterally and not subjected to a shareholder vote,209 intermediate-level review
should apply. Courts should analyze a board’s adoption of a forum selection
bylaw under a Unocal-type approach as follows. First, the increase in M&A
litigation generally and multi-forum litigation in particular should qualify as a
sufficient threat to corporate value. Commentators have noted the costs of
defending against litigation in multiple forums as well as the risk of conflicting
judgments and reverse auctions by plaintiffs’ counsel.210 In addition, boards
manage litigation and litigation risk as a core function of their duties.211 Second,
Delaware courts should treat adoption of a forum selection bylaw as a
proportionate response to the threat. Such bylaws address the problems
associated with multi-forum litigation without drastically reducing shareholders’
litigation rights.
Fee-shifting bylaws might be analyzed differently. Although the problem
of meritless litigation closely tracks the concern over multi-forum litigation, a
board’s determination that shareholders too frequently file suits that do not
discipline corporate management or vindicate shareholder rights is more
questionable.212 Nonetheless, the frequency with which mergers are challenged
through litigation coupled with the infrequency with which this litigation results

207. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465 (2015) (detailing the rise in merger litigation); Fisch,
supra note 10 (describing litigation bylaws as a response to that rise).
208. Joseph Grundfest was one of the first to suggest this approach. See Joseph Grundfest, Choice
of Forum Provisions in Intra-Corporate Litigation: Mandatory and Elective Approaches (Stanford
Univ. Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance Working Paper, Paper No. 91, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1690561.
209. See Romano & Sanga, supra note 56, at 27, 31 (reporting that, in the sample studied, “[o]nly
12 percent of midstream adoptions were put to a shareholder vote”).
210. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES: THE
REAL COSTS OF U.S. SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 1, 3 (2014),
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/EconomicConsequences_Web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BKG7-YCV8] (describing the costs of shareholder suits).
211. See, e.g., Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative
Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44 BUS. LAW. 503, 522 (1989)
(observing that “no principled distinction can be drawn between a board’s decisions relating to corporate
litigation generally and those relating to other business matters”).
212. This is especially true because a substantial percentage of shareholder litigation involves
challenges to director conduct or oversight. See, e.g., Erica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Litigation
Discovery and Corporate Governance: The Missing Story about the “Genius of American Corporate
Law,” 63 EMORY L.J. 1383, 1395 (2014) (arguing that the information revealed through discovery in
shareholder litigation “disciplines management”).
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in a monetary recovery for the plaintiff class has led many to conclude that a
substantial percentage of lawsuits are without merit.213 A reviewing court could
therefore conclude that the potential for excessive and frivolous litigation
constitutes a threat.
Whether a fee-shifting bylaw such as that seen in ATP represents a
reasonable response to that threat is, however, doubtful. As critics have observed,
the specific bylaw in ATP would likely discourage both “good” and “bad”
lawsuits from being brought.214 On the other hand, fee-shifting bylaws need not
be as broad as the bylaw adopted by the ATP board. Rather, a board could
narrowly tailor a fee-shifting bylaw so that it discouraged frivolous litigation
while allowing meritorious suits to proceed.215 More rigorous judicial scrutiny
would thus bring a more nuanced approach to the validity of fee-shifting bylaws
than either the broad acceptance of the ATP decision or the Delaware
legislature’s subsequent rejection of all charter and bylaw provisions that impose
liability on a shareholder in connection with the litigation of an internal corporate
claim.216
A third example is advance notice bylaws, which require shareholders to
provide the issuer with advance notice of their intent to nominate a director
candidate, and to disclose various pieces of information relating to that
nomination. Advance notice bylaws are almost ubiquitous among public
issuers.217 The Delaware courts have observed that “[a]dvance notice
requirements are ‘commonplace’ and ‘are often construed and frequently upheld
as valid by Delaware courts.’”218 The scope of advance notice bylaws varies
tremendously, however, both with respect to the amount of advance notice

213. See Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the Peppercorn
Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV.
557, 559–560 (2015) (summarizing this debate); DEL. STATE BAR COUNCIL, EXPLANATION OF
COUNCIL
LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSAL
3
(2015)
http://www.corporatedefensedisputes.com/files/2015/03/COUNCIL-SECOND-PROPOSALEXPLANATORY-PAPER-3-6-15-U0124513.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2N4-5K8F] (observing that
“[s]ome officers and directors and their advocates assert, on the other hand, that stockholder litigation
causes corporations expense without producing commensurate benefits”).
214. See., e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation
by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 30 (2015) (terming such a bylaw “extreme” because
it “[takes] no account of the merits of the underlying claim”); DEL. STATE BAR COUNCIL, supra note
213, at 3, 6 (arguing that fee-shifting bylaws like the one in ATP would make shareholder litigation
“untenable” and “eliminate the only extant regulation of substantive corporate law”).
215. See, e.g., Albert H. Choi, Fee-Shifting and Shareholder Litigation (Va. Law & Econ.
Research Working Paper No. 15, 2016) (developing a model for optimal fee-shifting bylaws, including
heightened judicial oversight).
216. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2016).
217. See Romano & Sanga, supra note 56.
218. Goggin v. Vermillion, Inc., No. 6465-VCN, 2011 WL 2347704, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 3,
2011) (quoting Openwave Sys., Inc. v. Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund I, Ltd., 924 A.2d 228,
238–39 (Del. Ch. 2007)).
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required and the extent of mandated disclosure.219 Commentators have
characterized the courts’ approach to advance notice bylaws as “[j]udicial
[s]chizophrenia.”220 In particular, the effort to determine when the requirements
of a specific bylaw excessively burden shareholders’ voting rights appears
somewhat unprincipled.221
The test proposed in this Article would add clarity. Issuers defend advance
notice bylaws on the basis that they allow shareholders sufficient time and
information to vote intelligently.222 A bylaw providing a notice period and
required information that is reasonably related to these objectives should survive
judicial scrutiny.223 To the extent that an advance notice bylaw has the effect of
precluding shareholders from exercising their voting rights, however, this test
would provide the court with a basis for invalidating it as disproportionate to
those goals.224
A similar intermediate-level scrutiny could be applied to other boardadopted bylaws that limit the effectiveness of shareholders’ voting rights. This
analysis would clarify the scope of the board’s authority.225 For example, in the
recent Frechter v. Zier decision, the board adopted a bylaw requiring a two-thirds
shareholder vote to remove a director.226 The court held that the bylaw was
invalid because it conflicted with section 141(k).227 The decision is in tension,
219. See, e.g., Elina Khasina, Note, Disclosure of “Beneficial Ownership” of Synthetic Positions
in Takeover Campaigns, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 904 (2009) (proposing that issuers adopt an
advance notice bylaw that requires shareholders to disclose their ownership of derivative securities).
220. Dale A. Oesterle & Alan R. Palmiter, Judicial Schizophrenia in Shareholder Voting Cases,
79 IOWA L. REV. 485, 570 (1994).
221. See, e.g., Morgan N. Neuwirth, Shareholder Franchise—No Compromise: Why the
Delaware Courts Must Proscribe All Managerial Interference with Corporate Voting, 145 U. PA. L.
REV. 423, 467 (1996) (describing Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992), a case involving the validity
of an advance notice bylaw, as “[o]ne of the more confusing cases in recent Delaware law”).
222. See Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 728 A.2d 25, 41 (Del. Ch. 1998)
(upholding bylaw on the basis that “the 90 to 100 day delay interval chosen by the Quickturn board is
reasonable in relation to th[e] purpose . . . [of giving] the shareholders a reasonable opportunity to inform
themselves about the issues presented”).
223. See id. at 40–43 (concluding that the specific bylaw at issue was a reasonable response to
the identified concerns); In re Gaylord Container Corp. S’holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 482 (Del. Ch.
2000) (stating that a sixty-day advance notice bylaw “merely lengthens the electoral contest in a way
that appears to strike a reasonable balance between the electorate’s need to hear out all participants in
the debate and the acquiror’s need for an adequate opportunity to line up a slate before the meeting”).
But see Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 319 (Del. Ch. 2000) (applying the “compelling
justification” standard to strike down a board-adopted supermajority bylaw, where the board’s “primary
purpose” was to impair stockholders).
224. See., e.g., Fisch, supra note 10, at 1655–56 (describing bylaws adopted by Allergan board
as unduly restrictive of shareholder voting rights).
225. See, e.g., J.W. Verret, Defending Against Shareholder Proxy Access: Delaware’s Future
Reviewing Company Defenses in the Era of Dodd-Frank, 36 J. CORP. LAW 391, 404–06 (2011)
(discussing potential board adoption of director qualification bylaws or bylaws that limit the powers of
dissident-nominated directors to defend shareholders’ rights).
226. Frechter v. Zier, No. 12038-VCG, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 214 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2017).
227. As the court noted, section 141(k) is subject to two exceptions—for corporations that have
classified boards and those that have cumulative voting. Id. at *5 n.20. Neither exception was applicable
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however, with section 216, which seems explicitly to authorize supermajority
bylaws,228 as well as earlier cases that have not viewed such bylaws as invalid.229
Rather than relying on the statute, the court’s analysis could have focused on the
board’s rationale for the bylaw and the extent to which a supermajority
requirement, in the context of the specific corporation, materially limited
shareholders’ voting rights. The court should have recognized that a
supermajority requirement does not, by itself, prevent shareholders from
achieving their desired outcome.
Finally, the same rationale can be applied to provide a more principled
analysis of the shareholder-adopted bylaw in AFSCME. Because of the critical
importance of the shareholders’ right to elect directors, in addition to subjecting
board efforts to interfere with that right to careful scrutiny, courts should view
shareholder power to adopt bylaws that focus on the election and structure of the
board more expansively. The touchstone for the validity of such bylaws should
be the subject matter—the election process—rather than whether the bylaws are
properly characterized as substantive or procedural.
This approach appears to be consistent with legislative intent as reflected
in the Delaware statutory amendment subsequent to the AFSCME decision,
which explicitly authorized shareholders to adopt bylaws implementing proxy
access230 and authorized reimbursement of proxy contest expenses.231 The same
principle should be applied to similar shareholder-adopted bylaws that address
the power of the shareholders to nominate, elect, and remove members of the
board, rather than requiring explicit statutory authorization for each. Notably,
however, the analysis suggested in this Part does not interfere with the
fundamental role of the board in overseeing the operation of the corporation and
is therefore less intrusive than the shareholder empowerment approach discussed
in the preceding Section of this Part.
CONCLUSION
The contractual approach to corporate law—which has been widely
defended in legal scholarship for more than twenty-five years—has received

in Frechter. The court further noted that its decision was limited to the validity of a supermajority bylaw,
observing that section 102(b)(4) of the statute provides that a certificate of incorporation may require
“for any corporate action . . . a larger portion of the stock . . . than is required by this chapter.” Id. at *5
n.19 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(4) (2017)).
228. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2017) (“Subject to this chapter in respect of the vote that
shall be required for a specified action, the certificate of incorporation or bylaws of any corporation
authorized to issue stock may specify . . . the votes that shall be necessary for, the transaction of any
business . . . .”).
229. See, e.g., Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000) (rejecting boardadopted supermajority bylaw based on the board’s purpose for adopting it).
230. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2017).
231. Id. § 113 (2017).
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strong judicial support in two recent Delaware decisions.232 The courts’
expansive endorsement of freedom of contract in these cases opens the door to
broad-based experimentation and implementation of New Governance
provisions tailored to issuer-specific needs. The Delaware courts have explicitly
relied on contractual principles to justify broad deference to this
experimentation.
At the same time, these decisions may stretch the contract analogy too far.
In particular, several aspects of existing law limit the ability of shareholders to
participate on an equal footing with boards in the private ordering process. This
asymmetry undermines the justification for the broad judicial deference. In the
absence of true shareholder power to limit the board’s adoption of unwanted
governance provisions, the courts’ characterization of New Governance
provisions in terms of contract is overstated.
One possible solution is for the courts or the legislature to overturn existing
limits on shareholder power so as to warrant reliance on the contractual analogy.
Although this approach may be desirable, increased shareholder empowerment
raises a number of potential concerns. Courts could instead rethink the existing
level of deference given to board-adopted governance provisions and subject
those provisions to greater judicial scrutiny. Intermediate-level scrutiny would
allow courts to play a meaningful role in preventing boards from adopting
bylaws that excessively interfere with shareholder rights. The need for courts to
exercise such scrutiny responds to the reality that the corporation is not truly a
contract, and shareholders, due to existing legal and practical obstacles, cannot
protect themselves effectively.

232. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014); Boilermakers Local
154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
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